The role of common cultural heritage in external promotion of modern turkey: yunus emre cultural centres by Kaya, Ayhan & Tecmen, Ayşe
THE ROLE OF COMMON CULTURAL
HERITAGE IN EXTERNAL PROMOTION
OF MODERN TURKEY:
YUNUS EMRE CULTURAL CENTRES
Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen
2011
Working Paper No: 4 EU/4/2011
İstanbul Bilgi University, European Institute, Dolapdere Campus,
Kurtuluﬂ Deresi Cad. Yahya Köprüsü Sk. No: 1
34440 Dolapdere / ‹stanbul, Turkey
Phone: +90 212 311 52 40 • Fax: +90 212 250 87 48
e-mail: europe@bilgi.edu.tr • http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr
A Member of Laureate International Universities

THE ROLE OF COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE IN
MODERN TURKEY’S EXTERNAL PROMOTION:
YUNUS EMRE CULTURAL CENTRES
This Working Paper has been compiled from previous work conducted at Istanbul Bilgi Univer-
sity’s European Institute in the context of the 7th Framework Project entitled “Identities and mo-
dernities in Europe” (SSH-CT-2009-215949).
Description of the Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME) project
Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME) is a collaborative research project funded by the Eu-
ropean Commission as part of the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) under Socio-economic 
Sciences and Humanities. The IME project is carried out by a consortium composed of Kingston 
University, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Helsinki Uni-
versity, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Sciences-Po), the University of Duisburg-
Essen, the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies at the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences, the International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), İstanbul 
Bilgi University and the University of Zagreb.
In its investigation of European identities, IME refers to a wide range of definitions of ‘us, 
the Europeans’ proposed and acted upon by various actors in and around the current European 
Union (EU), and in particular refers to nine cases: Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
The project addresses three major issues regarding European identities: what they are, how 
they have been formed and what trajectories they may take from now on. IME first investigates 
the diversity of European identities as it manifests in the nine cases. It then examines the various 
ways in which these diverse self-definitions have been formulated and maintained in the differ-
ent societal, cultural and systemic settings with which they have been interacting through vari-
ous processes and forces. Subsequently, IME aims to identify commonalities among the diverse 
European identities in these nine cases, which will form the basis for a grounded projection of 
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the possible trajectories European identities may take as the processes of European integration 
continue.
The Project, which began in May 2009, is expected to conclude in April 2012.
For further information about the Project, please visit:
http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/research/european/ime/  
http://eu.bilgi.edu.tr/research400.asp
IME Project reports are available at:
http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/public/ime/
the role of common cultural heritage in external promotion of modern turkey: yunus emre cultural centres 5
Information on the Turkish Team
Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya, Professor of Political Science
Professor of Politics at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University; Di-
rector of the European Institute; Willy Brandt Professor at the Malmö Institute for Studies of Mi-
gration, Diversity and Welfare, Malmö University, Sweden; specialises in European identities, 
Euro-Turks in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the Circassian diaspora in Tur-
key, and the construction and articulation of modern diasporic identities; received his PhD and 
MA degrees at the University of Warwick; His forthcoming book is Europeanization and Toler-
ance in Turkey (London: Palgrave, 2013); his latest book is on the comparison of contemporary 
integration, citizenship and integration regimes of Germany, France, Belgium and the Nether-
lands (Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, London: Palgrave, 2009 
April); his other recent books are as follows, Contemporary Migrations in Turkey: Integration 
or Return (Istanbul Bilgi University Press, in Turkish, co-written with others), Belgian-Turks, 
Brussels: (King Baudouin Foundation, 2008, co-written with Ferhat Kentel), Euro-Turks: A 
Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: CEPS Publications, 2005, co-written 
with Ferhat Kentel, Turkish version by Bilgi University); wrote another book titled Sicher in 
Kreuzberg: Constructing Diasporas, published in two languages, English (Bielefeld: Transkript 
verlag, 2001) and Turkish (Istanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2000); translated Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries by Fredrik Barth and Citizenship and Social Classes by T. H. Marshall and Tom Bot-
tomore; co-edited Issues Without Borders: Migration, Citizenship, Human Rights, Global Jus-
tice, Gender and Security (Istanbul, Baglam Publishing House, in Turkish, 2003). Received 
Turkish Social Science Association Prize in 2003; received Turkish Sciences Academy (TÜBA-
GEBİP) Prize in 2005; received 2005 Sedat Simavi Research Prize; and also received Euroactiv 
European Prize. He is recently engaged in two different FP7 projects called Modernities and 
Identities in Europe; and Pluralism and Tolerance in the EU, and another project called “Social 
Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe”. He has been 
nominated as Willy Brandt Professor at Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and 
Welfare (MIM) of Malmö University (Sweden). He has been appointed by the European Com-
mission as Jean Monnet Chair (2011-2014). His forthcoming book is: Europeanization and Tol-
erance in Turkey (London: Palgrave, 2013).
Ayşe Tecmen
Ayse Tecmen graduated from Emory University in the USA with a BA degree in Political Science 
and received her MA degree in European Studies with High Honors from Istanbul Bilgi Univer-
sity. She currently works at Istanbul Bilgi University as an FP7 Programme project assistant un-
der the supervision of Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya. She actively takes part in the organization of Sum-
mer Academies on EU-Turkey relations and the organization of seminar series on sustainable de-
velopment in the Black Sea region. Her fields of interest include culture, identity formation, cul-
tural tourism and transport policy with reference to air transport liberalization. She is current 
studying for her MPhil/Phd degree in Politics at Bristol University, UK.

the role of common cultural heritage in external promotion of modern turkey: yunus emre cultural centres 7
THE ROLE OF COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE IN
MODERN TURKEY’S EXTERNAL PROMOTION:
YUNUS EMRE CULTURAL CENTRES
Introduction
This study investigates the role of Yunus Emre Cultural Centres in the promotion of Turkish so-
ciety and culture abroad with reference to the theory of multiple modernities - a theory that is 
likely to revitalize the role of culture and religion in social and political inquiries. We will argue 
that Turkey has recently begun instrumentalizing its language and culture in promoting Turkey 
abroad through the Yunus Emre Cultural Centres scattered around the world, and in doing so is 
making alternative use of a neo-Ottoman discourse and a modernist discourse dependent on the 
peculiarities of the location in question. It will be claimed that the current political elite in pow-
er is inclined to position Turkey as a hegemonic power among its neighbours (the Middle East, 
the Balkans, North Africa and the Caucasus as well as in the Central Asian Turkic republics) us-
ing a Turco-Islamist discourse, and in European Union countries by instrumentalizing the mi-
grant entities of Turkish origin settled there. In both instances, it seems the Turkish political elite 
has proven that their manoeuvres comply with the multiple modernities paradigm: They have 
portrayed themselves as active political agents imposing their cultural, linguistic, historical and 
religious tenets on other nations, rather than being imposed upon by the linear form of moder-
nity monopolized by the west.
These manoeuvres also indicate that the contemporary Turkish political elite is not willing 
to accept the hegemony of the linear form of classical European modernity, but offer instead an 
alternative form of modernity arising out of the cultural, religious and historical specificities of 
Turkey. However, it will also be maintained that what the Justice and Development Party gov-
ernment is pursuing is in line with the neo-liberal form of governmentality, to use Michel Fou-
cault (1979)’s term, which is inclined to reduce the political, social and economic to the cultural 
and religious in the same vein as postmodernity (Dirlik, 2006).1
In this study, we will refer to our research findings from the FP7 project “Identities and 
modernities in Europe” (SSH-CT-2009-215949). Yunus Emre Cultural Centres are quite newly-
established institutions, and hence our research on the relevant scientific literature did not yield 
any results. However, these centres have been discussed in daily newspapers, and the Yunus 
Emre Foundation publishes official bulletins which provide speeches, statements and opinions of 
political figures as well as providing an overview of the activities of the Yunus Emre Institute. 
Accordingly, newspaper articles and these bulletins2 will constitute the primary resources we in-
vestigate and analyze. The speeches and statements of the leading figures were scrutinized 
through the Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak, 1999, 2002, 2010). This means that the cho-
1 For further information about the notion of governmentality, see Foucault (1979: 21). Michel Foucault 
describes the concept of governmentality as a collection of methods used by political elites to maintain their 
power, or as an art of acquiring power. In other words, governmentality refers to the practices which 
characterise the form of supervision a state exercises over its subjects, their wealth, misfortunes, customs, 
bodies, souls and habits. It is the art of governing.
2 Please note that the Yunus Emre Institute Bulletins are published in Turkish only, and quotations from these in 
this study were translated by the authors. 
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sen texts were critically explored by the researchers in order to best place each of them in the dis-
cursive map of the Centres. In the meantime, an extensive literature review was also made in or-
der to position the speeches of the chosen figures alongside the literature.
This paper will consist of two parts. The first part will provide information on the multi-
ple modernities theory and how this theory is applicable to the Turkish case via an introduction 
to the academic literature on self-reflexivity and civil and civic participation in Turkey’s modern-
ization process as of the early 2000s. In addition to the introduction of these concepts as refer-
ence points for understanding the multiple modernities theory, the first part will also investigate 
the Yunus Emre cultural centres abroad, and will aim to elucidate on the discourses used by the 
political and bureaucratic elite in the establishment of these centres. The second part will primar-
ily focus on the employment of the common heritage approach by these Centres, with particular 
emphasis on the reinforcement of cultural ties with neighbouring countries based on Turkish 
language and Islam. We will further argue that the revitalization and restructuring of cultural 
and religious affinity in contemporary Turkish cultural diplomacy constitutes an important ex-
ample of how cultural politics and diplomacy contribute to the ways in which the Turkish mod-
ernization has become a non-linear and transformative process.
Multiple Modernities: A rupture from the classical modernity theories
In a classical perspective, modernity was understood to be a linear and teleological process, 
spreading from the West to the rest of the world. Almost all the 19th and 20th century sociology 
teleologically took modernity as a one-way process, experienced by all nations being trans-
formed from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Auguste Comte, Georg Wilhelm Fredrich Hegel, Fer-
dinand Tönnies, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Max Weber, Bronislaw Ma-
linowski and several other social scientists assumed and claimed that all societies undergo the 
same transformations, but over differing periods of time. In the very end, they would all be 
“modern” in a Western sense. According to the metanarratives of modernity such as nation-
state, the West, proletariat, high culture, teleological thinking, progress and totality, irrational 
attachments to the local, particular, tradition, roots, national myths and superstitions would 
gradually be replaced by more rational, secular and universalist social identities. In this frame of 
reference, modernization is equated with Westernization, a process which is very visible in the 
narrative of Turkish modernization. This belief also resulted in a subjective evaluation of West-
ern-type civilization as the superior model of civilization, thus promoting Euro-American hege-
mony in the discourse on modernity.
A recent new form of literature heavily criticizes the linear perception of modernity. The 
Euro-American hegemony is called into question in the context of contemporary discourses on 
modernity generated and discussed by Schmuel N. Eisenstadt, Barrington Moore, Charles Tay-
lor, Gerard Delanty, John Arnasson, Bo Strath, Peter Wagner, Willfried Spohn and Atsuko Ich-
ijo. The ways in which such scholars debate modernity constitutes a separate literature on the 
idea of multiple modernities. The idea of multiple modernities opposes classical views of mod-
ernization, and therefore denies the monopoly of the West on modernity. Schmuel N. Eistenstadt 
admits that modernity was, in its origins, a Western project, spread to the rest of the world 
through military and economic imperialism, especially in the form of colonialism, but he con-
cludes that the West has failed in the promotion of a homogenizing (cultural) program of mo-
dernity. Instead, Eisenstadt observes the emergence of new centres of modernity all round the 
world in which the originally Western model of modernity is continuously reinterpreted and re-
constructed. The varying interpretations of modernity manifest themselves in different institu-
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tional and ideological patterns, and are carried forward by various actors such as the agents of 
new social movements. In other words, multiple modernities theory maintains that modernity 
should not be understood as a linear and homogenising process vis-à-vis secularization or ratio-
nalization, but as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of politi-
cal and cultural programmes (see interalia Eisenstadt 2000, 2001, 2005; Delanty 2006; Arnas-
son 2006; Martinelli 2007; Boldt, Bozec, Duchesne, Ichijo, Salvatore and Strath (2009)). Eisen-
stadt summarizes the idea of multiple modernities as follows:
“The idea of multiple modernities presumes that the best way to understand the contemporary world 
indeed to explain the history of modernities is to see it as a story of continual constitution and recons-
titution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. These ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional 
and ideological patterns are carried forward by specific social actors in close connection with social, 
political, and intellectual activists, and also by social movements pursuing different programs of mo-
dernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern” (Eisenstadt 2000: 2).
By the same token, Ibrahim Kaya (2004b: 37-39) argues that modernity is an open-ended hori-
zon in which there are spaces for multiple interpretations. This immediately implies a critique of 
totalizing theories of modernity. He rightfully claims that it is modernity which makes it possi-
ble for radically plural world-interpretations to be expressed openly, and it is for this reason that 
the field in which human beings live necessarily becomes a field of tensions. Modernity’s open-
ness to interpretation makes the concept of the plurality of modernities necessary.
Multiple Modernities theory in Turkish academic literature
The idea of multiple modernities is debated in Turkish academic literature through the works of 
Nilüfer Göle, İbrahim Kaya, Ferhat Kentel and Ayhan Kaya. The works of Nilüfer Göle (2003 
and 2009) and Kaya and Kentel (2005 and 2007) provide some alternative interpretations for 
the growing visibility of Islamic symbols in the public space in Turkey as well as in western Eu-
ropean countries.3 Their interpretation of modernity equates modernity with social (civil) and 
political (civic) participation. The social and political action of those who have strong faith in Is-
lam makes them modern, although they do not fit into the classical definition of western moder-
nity. What makes them modern is their act of protest, in other words their self-reflexivity, which 
they build against the detrimental forces of globalization, and their participation in public life.
Ibrahim Kaya makes theoretical interventions on the idea of multiple modernities through 
the works of Schmuel N. Eisenstadt, Johann Arnason and Peter Wagner. Scrutinizing the rela-
tionship between women and Islam in Turkey, Ibrahim Kaya (2004a) asserts that the current Is-
lamism of veiled women may be understood as essentially modern since the act of protest and 
self-reflexivity is embedded in the very idea of modernity.4 Kaya also argues that it is more plau-
sible to talk about modernity in its plural form, as it is intertwined with multiple set of interpre-
tations, as in Kemalism, Islamism, liberalism, national socialism, Fascism and Leninism (Kaya, 
3 Kaya and Kentel (2005 and 2007) discuss multiple forms of modernity in the framework of the Islamic diaspora 
in western Europe. To put it differently, they use the multiple modernity theory to scrutinize the role of the 
agency in minority context vis-a-vis hegemonic majorities.
4 Schmuel N. Eisenstadt argues that self-reflexivity and protest are inherent constituents of modernity: “[Modernity] 
focused first on the evaluation of the major dimensions of human experience, and especially on the place of 
reason in the construction of nature, of human society and human history, as against the more expressivist 
dimension. Secondly, it focused on the tension between reflexivity and active approaches to human life. Thirdly, 
it focused on totalizing and pluralistic approaches to human life and the constitution of society and, finally, on 
control or discipline, on the one side, and autonomy or freedom, on the other” (cited in Delanty, 2004: 395-396).
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2004b: 40). These works tend to propose that equating modernity with westernization in Tur-
key is a rather pathological inclination, based as it is on the assumption that western civilization 
is superior in comparison to others. On the contrary, the idea of multiple modernities does not 
yield to a kind of hierarchy between cultures, or civilizations, in a similar vein to what Eisenstadt 
(2005) calls pluralistic modernity with reference to Erasmus, Vico and Herder. In brief, multiple 
modernities literature in general, and the works of Turkish scholars in particular, argue that new 
centres of modernity are founded on the basis of increased self-reflexivity and intensified cultur-
al tensions, leading to increased social and political participation as well as the contestation of 
the general Euro-American (or Western) hegemony and supposed superiority.
The Origins of the Yunus Emre Foundation and Cultural Centres
There have been several state initiatives in Turkey aiming to promote culture and cultural coop-
eration. For instance, there are the Turkish Cultural Centres established by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs as state initiatives, functioning in accordance with Regulations on Turkish Cultural 
Centres (1986) and under the Law on the Establishment and Functioning of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. According to the Ministry, these centres have been estab-
lished “with a view to promoting Turkish culture, language and art and in order to contribute 
to bilateral relations between Turkey and other countries, as well as to help Turkish citizens in 
their adaptation to the country in which they live.”5 Turkish Cultural Centres are located in sev-
eral cities abroad such as Berlin, Hannover, Köln, Frankfurt, Almaty, Ashkhabad, Sarajevo, 
Tehran, Amman, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Damascus.
In 2007, in addition to these Centres, the Yunus Emre Foundation was established, with 
the aim of introducing Turkish culture, society and language to the outside world. The Founda-
tion was established as a state foundation under Law 5653, dated May 5, 2007, with its head-
quarters in Ankara. Article 1 of the Law identifies the purpose of the Act as the following:
“The purpose of this Act is, to introduce Turkey, its cultural heritage, the Turkish language, culture 
and art, and enhance Turkey’s friendship with other countries, increase cultural exchange, in that re-
gard to present domestic and foreign information and documents on Turkey to the benefit of the 
world, to serve those who wish to receive an education in the fields of Turkish language, culture and 
arts, to establish a Yunus Emre Research Institution in Turkey and a Yunus Emre Cultural Centre ab-
road….” (Law 5653, Article 1).
Currently, there are ten operational Yunus Emre Cultural Centres in nine countries, as well as 
six centres in five countries that are expected to become operational by the end of 2011. The lo-
cations of these centres are as follows:
5  Official Website of the Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ 
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Table 1.
Yunus Emre Cultural Centres Abroad
Country City Opening Date Region
Belgium  Brussels 18 October 2010 Europe
Bosnia-Herzegovina Sarajevo 17 October 2010 Balkans
Albania Tirana 11 December 2009 Balkans
Egypt  Cairo 03 March 2010 MiddleEast
Macedonia Skopje 26 March 2010 Balkans
Kazakhstan Astana 01 March 2010 Caucus
England London 09 November 2010 Europe
Syria Damascus 13 December 2010 Middle East
Kosovo Pristina 27 August 2011 Balkans
 Prizren  26 August 2011
Japan Tokyo In progress Asia
Lebanon Beirut In progress Middle East
Romania Bucharest In progress
 Constanza In progress
Serbia TBA In progress Balkans
Iran  TBA In progress Middle East
Source: The information in this table was compiled by the authors from the official website and the Bulletins of the 
Yunus Emre Institute.
The rapid proliferation of Yunus Emre Centres in various European, Balkan and Middle 
Eastern cities represent a unique case study in understanding the various aspects of modern 
Turkish culture and cultural policy priorities with respect to Turkish cultural diplomacy.
It is also important to note that the Yunus Emre Institute and the cultural centres have 
been given an important role in Turkish foreign policy. For instance, while Ertuğrul Günay, 
Minister of Culture and Tourism, calls these centres the “civil pillar of foreign policy” (Yunus 
Emre Bulletin, No: 7, 2010: 10), the chairman of the Yunus Emre Foundation Board of Trustees 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, notes that “foreign policy is not carried out 
solely with diplomacy but also with cultural, economic and trade networks. He further argues 
that the mission of the Yunus Emre Institute is related to Turkish foreign policy’s strategic di-
mension and popularization of Turkish language, protection of Turkish cultural heritage, and 
the dissemination of Turkish culture to the outside world. This will enable us to place our his-
torical-cultural richness in our current strategy” (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 7, 2010: 8). Similar-
ly, in his opening speech in Tirana, Albania, President Abdullah Gül emphasized that:
“These centres are Turkey’s invisible power. I mean preserving the vitality of her cultural heritage is 
Turkey’s biggest power. Not many countries have this power. We should appreciate its worth” (Tur-
kish Presidency, 11.12.2009).
Moreover, the symbolism in the name of the Institute and the locations of the centres are reflec-
tive of the changing foreign policy priorities of the state. In that sense, the emphasis on certain 
regions, primarily the Balkans and the Middle-East, is complementary to the common cultural 
heritage approach. This approach is further supplemented by an emphasis on the Turkish lan-
guage and historical legacy. As we will further investigate, the locations of these centres also con-
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stitute a challenge to the traditional understanding of Turkish modernity, which acknowledged 
the superiority of western civilizations.
A Symbolic Name and the Turkish Language
The name of the institutions is significant in that Yunus Emre, a Turkish poet and Sufi mystic of 
the late 1300-early 1400s is considered the pioneering poet of Turkish culture. His name was 
chosen for the Institutes to convey the importance of Turkish language. To that effect, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan stated that:
“For thousands of years, we have been the carriers of a unique civilization, history and heritage in 
which we have moulded and collated different cultures, different civilizations, along with our own cul-
ture. Turkish is not the communicative language of the people living in these lands. Turkish is also a 
language of science, at the same time a language of arts and a language of literature. Turkish is the lan-
guage of Yunus Emre, Pir Sultan Abdal, Karacaoğlan, Fuzuli, Baki, Nazım Hikmet, Necip Fazıl” (Yu-
nus Emre Bulletin, No: 1, 2010: 4).
Similarly, Ertuğrul Günay noted that:
“We will establish a Yunus Emre Institute to tell the world about Yunus Emre...We will set up branc-
hes in many countries of the world. We will talk about Yunus. We will talk about his philosophy. We 
will show the world the riches of the Turkish language. Today, maybe belatedly we are doing what is 
necessary to show our respect for the Turkish language. Turkish is one of the most important langua-
ges of the world, prevalent and deeply-rooted, and a lot of our people speak this language outside the 
territories of Turkey” (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 1, 2010:7-8, emphasis ours).
As these quotes indicate, there is a growing emphasis on the Turkish language and Turkology.6 
In that respect, the Foundation also established the Yunus Emre Turkish Education Centre 
(YETEC), which anticipates teaching Turkish within the framework of the Yunus Emre Institu-
tion. The emphasis on the Turkish language is an important step in the introduction and recog-
nition of Turkish as a common language in Turkic countries, but it also provides for a proficien-
cy testing component, which is the Turkish Proficiency Examination System (Türkçe Yeterlilik 
Sınav Sistemi). This system anticipates the establishment of an examination, which will contrib-
ute to recognition of the Turkish language through an international standard while promoting 
the use of the language.7 Furthermore, the director of the Yunus Emre Institute, Prof. Dr. Ali 
Fuat Bilkan stated that
“In addition to the success of the Turkish foreign policy, the investments of Turkish businessmen ha-
ve increased the attention to the Turkish language. Turkey has gained visibility. As Turkey gained eco-
nomic and political visibility, the popularity of our language has increased. Particularly in the Balkans 
and Middle East there is an interest in Turkey”.8
6 It is also important to note that there are various efforts that emphasize the importance of Turkish language in 
forging and/or strengthening cultural ties. One such effort is the Agreement Concerning the Joint Administra-
tion of Turkish Culture and Arts (TÜRKSOY) signed on 12 July 1993 in Almaty by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The Agreement established “TURKSOY”, which foresees 
cooperation among Turkish-speaking countries. As such, TURKSOY’s aims and activities revolve around iden-
tifying and promoting the common values of those countries, which is in line with the state’s growing emphasis 
on Turkish language and literature, http://www.turksoy.org.
7  Anadolu Ajansı, 21.12.2010, http://www.aa.com.tr, entry date 10 May 2011.
8  Daily Zaman, 19.01.2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr, entry date 13 May 2011.
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President of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve 
Kalkınma İdaresi Başkanlığı, TİKA), Prof. Dr. Musa Kulaklıkaya, further indicates that Turkish 
businessmen and their economic investments, hence the economic ties that they forge, require 
Turkish language education.9 TİKA10 is a state institution established under Law 4668, pub-
lished in Official Gazette No. 24400 on 12 May 2001, and which operates under the Turkish 
Prime Ministry. TIKA is considered a foreign policy instrument whereby cooperative efforts are 
carried out in Central Asia, Caucasia, the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa, in other words 
in regions where there is a shared language and culture. Kulaklıkaya explains the aims of TIKA 
as follows:
“Initially we are providing aid to countries with mutual historical, political and cultural backgrounds. 
These common backgrounds let us answer the needs of these countries much more expeditiously, and 
this created a nice synergy. As a result of our aid and efforts, we possess a tangible presence in the re-
gions where we operate.” (UNDP, 2009)
Similarly, the Minister of Culture and Tourism, Ertuğrul Günay, noted that “Our people have 
been in Germany for the past 50 years. There is no Turkish Cultural Institute but there is Goethe 
Institute in Turkey, there is a Cervantes Institute in Turkey, there are French and English cultur-
al centres. Now, as of 2008, there is Yunus Emre [Institute] in all Balkan and Middle-Eastern 
countries. We are opening Yunus Emre Institutes in Germany, England, Russia and France. We 
will teach Turkish and its dialects.11
Turkey: A Soft Power in the Cradle of Civilizations
While the promotion of Turkish language constitutes an important element of the Institute’s 
goals, a close analysis of the Yunus Emre Bulletins reveals that there are repeated references to 
the cultural heritage of Turkey, with particular emphasis on the ‘cradle of civilizations’ ap-
proach. To that effect, during his speech on the occasion of the opening of the Yunus Emre 
Foundation in Ankara, Chairman of the Yunus Emre Foundation Board of Trustees and Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated:
“This foundation has two important standing goals. First, to enable the meeting of our national cultu-
re with the universal culture, and increase its influence in universal culture... In history, very few nati-
ons that have directly encountered different cultures and civilizations, have sometimes become the su-
bject of those civilizations, sometimes generated cultural blends from these civilizations, sometimes 
participated in intense and active communication as our nation has” (Yunus Emre Bulletin 1, No: 1, 
2010: 6).
Corresponding to the cultural heritage approach, the locations of the Institutes reflect the com-
mon cultural heritage approach with a neo-Ottoman undertone. As we will illustrate, these lo-
cations were in fact purposely chosen to strengthen the common heritage discourse. For instance, 
during his speech at the inauguration of the Yunus Emre Institute in Sarajevo, Mr. Davutoğlu 
stated that:
9  Daily Zaman, 07.02.2011, http://www.zaman.com.tr, entry date 12 June 2011.
10  For further information on TIKA, visit: http://www.tika.gov.tr 
11  Anadolu Ajansı, 20.12.2010, http://www.aa.com.tr, entry date 15 June 2011.
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“This is the first cultural centre that we have opened. It is not a coincidence that the first centre is in 
Sarajevo. This is an informed decision that we made after much thought because, if we thought about 
where Turkish culture was reflected best, this place would be the city of Sarajevo. As Istanbul is the 
fundamental city of Turkish culture, Sarajevo is the city of our common culture. Similarly, in as much 
as Sarajevo is a city of the Bosnians, so too is Istanbul. Başçarşı and Kapalı Çarşı, Gazi Hüsrev Bey 
Mosque and Sultunahmet (Blue Mosque) have the same spirit. Istanbul and Sarajevo are two soul bro-
thers” (Yunus Emre Bulletin No: 2, 2010:3).
Similarly, in his opening speech in Skopje, Macedonia, Davutoğlu noted that the common cul-
ture has been engraved into the streets of Skopje (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 5, 2010: 6). Most 
importantly, it has become clear vis-a-vis the locations of these centres that the Balkan region is 
important in the revival of cultural relations and cultural ties. Furthermore, these centres are al-
so reflective of the motivations of the state to influence the culture of these regions. To that ef-
fect, Davutoğlu noted in Skopje,
“… We would like to make a novel contribution to cultural exchange in the Balkans. Cultural relati-
ons between Turkey and Macedonia will lead the way to a new Enlightenment in the Balkans.” (Yu-
nus Emre Bulletin, No: 5, 2010: 7)
Corresponding to Davutoğlu’s statement, during the opening of the cultural centre in Astana, 
President Abdullah Gül stated that:
“We should not keep our language, culture and traditions only to ourselves. Rather, we should keep 
them alive and spread them. After learning our culture and language well, we should not hesitate to le-
arn other cultures. While we have great history in Balkans and in this geography and our works rema-
in standing, training will be given at the Yunus Emre Culture centres here to those who wish to learn 
Turkish. There is a great demand for the centres. There are cultural centres in great countries. We will 
introduce Turkish Culture with the Yunus Emre Cultural Centres”.12
In the Turkish context, modernization was often defined as a transformation process along 
the lines of Western civilization, which inevitably meant the strengthening of Turkey’s ties with 
the West and a weakening of those with Eastern countries. Particularly in the Kemalist era, the 
introduction of Roman alphabet-based Turkish alphabet (replacing the Ottoman alphabet) and 
the establishment of the secular state (restricting the role of Islam in the public sphere) changed 
the dynamics of the Turkey’s relations with Middle-Eastern countries, and served to endorse the 
assumed superiority of Western civilizations.13 However, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) government has emphasized the predicament regarding Turkey’s role between Western 
and Eastern cultures. For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted that Turkey has responsibilities 
towards the Middle Eastern region stemming from historical ties, and stated that:
“Turkey is facing the West, but Turkey never turns her back on the East. We cannot be indifferent to 
countries with whom we have lived for thousands of years. We cannot abandon our brothers to their 
fate”.14
12  Anadolu Ajansı, 26.05.2010, http://www.aa.com.tr, entry date 13 June 2011.
13  See, Bozdağlıoglu, Yücel (2008). Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Insight Turkey Vol 10, No. 
1: 55-75. 
14  Daily Sabah, 08.04.2010, http://www.sabah.com.tr, entry date 13 June 2011.
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The revival of these discourses, emphasizing the common history and heritage of the Mid-
dle Eastern region, is also complemented by more assertive foreign policy and the institution of 
cultural initiatives in Middle Eastern countries. To that effect, in his speech at the opening of the 
Yunus Emre Institute in Cairo, Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that:
“It is not a coincidence that Cairo is selected for the third centre. The Cairo Yunus Emre Centre is al-
so the first institute we have opened in the Middle Eastern region and the Arab world, because we con-
sider Cairo the heart of the Arab world and believe that a culture active in Cairo will be active in the 
Arab world” (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 4, 2010:5).
All these political discourses indicate that Turkey is tempted to increase its authority as a 
pivotal power in the region. Its changing role in the region, specifically in the Arab world, is 
mainly shaped by the various kinds of drives it embraces:
a) its political drive, made obvious by Erdoğan’s discourse on the Palestinian issue and 
AKP’s gradual distancing from Israel,
b) its cultural-religious drive, visible in AKP’s cultural religious affinity with the Arab 
world rather than the Kemalist laicists,
c) its economic drive, springing from the willingness of AKP’s electorate and the newly-
growing Anatolian bourgeoisie to open up to emerging markets in the Middle East, Af-
rica, the Caucasus, and Central Asia at a time of Euroscepticism, growing since 2005, 
and
d) its transformative drive, or EU anchor, making it appear as a stable, democratic, liber-
al, peaceful and efficient country (Kirişçi, 2011).
Joseph Nye (2004: 5) defines soft power as “the abil ity to shape the preferences of others”. 
In other words, the ability to shape the ways in which the others act, think, imagine and perceive by 
means of cohesive instruments such as the ideological instruments of the state (popular culture, me-
dia, church, education institutions). In abolishing visa requirements for neighbouring countries 
like Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran, Turkey shows its desire to increase its political and cultur-
al impact in the region. When considered in combination with political communication process-
es such as the hero worship of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Muslim world after 
the now-famous Davos meeting, and US President Obama’s priority visit to Turkey, the effects 
of Turkish popular culture definitely warrant investigation. It seems that Turkey’s ruling politi-
cal elite have invested in a culturalist and religious discourse to promote Turkey in the region as 
well as in the EU.
There is certainly a growing interest in Turkey among Middle Eastern countries. Turkey is 
considered an emerging soft power in the region. One might even see evidence of Turkey turn-
ing its soft power into smart power. The Commission on Smart Power constituted by the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), published a report co-chaired by Joseph Nye and 
Richard Armitage in 2007. In the report, the term ‘smart power’ was used as meaning a combi-
nation of hard power and soft power. The report puts forward the means for implementing US 
smart power, and calls on the US to specifically focus on five critical areas in order to become a 
smart power:
1) Alliances, partnerships and institutions;
2) Global development;
3) Public diplomacy;
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4) Economic integration; and
5) Technology and innovation.15
Drawing on these suggestions made by the Commission on Smart Power, and considering Tur-
key’s drives in the region, one could argue that Turkey is following in the footsteps of the US in 
order to become a hegemonic smart power in the region.
Using its role as a bridge between the continents, Turkey is becoming a trading country: 
Foreign trade volume was USD330 billion in 2008 and USD300 billion in 2010 compared to 
USD20 billion in 1985. Turkish entrepreneurs invest in neighbouring countries, including Iraq, 
Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Central Asia, Syria, Lebanon and Greece, through TUSIAD, MUSI-
AD, DEIK, TOBB, TUSCON, and TIM. Turkey has also signed free trade agreements with Syr-
ia, Jordan and Lebanon in line with European Mediterranean Policy and European Neighbour-
hood Policy. Similarly, Turkish universities are also attracting students from the Middle East, the 
Balkans and Central Asia. The newly-established Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities16 attached to the Prime Ministry is dealing with the growing number of interna-
tional students coming from the so-called ‘related communities’, a definition more or less cultur-
ally and religiously loaded, and in line with the neo-Ottoman lebensraum specified by the Yunus 
Emre Cultural Centres.17
The growing popularity of Turkish soap operas throughout the region is another indicator 
of Turkey’s soft power potential in the region. In addition to the economic and political initia-
tives Turkey has recently undertaken, Turkish soap operas broadcast in the Middle East, the 
Caucasus, the Balkans and North Africa may also be viewed as a kind of soft power. According 
to Orhan, Turkey constitutes an example of a Muslim society coexisting with Western political 
values (Orhan, 2009). Turkish soap operas such as “Noor” (Gümüs), “Sanawat ad Dayyaa 
“(Ihlamurlar Altında) and Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of Wolves) have recently become very popular 
in the region in a way that has made Turkey a soft power culturally in her immediate neighbour-
hood. Hakan Altınay (2008) defines this new phenomenon with the following words:
15 http://media.csis.org/smartpower/071105_CSIS_Smart_Power_Report.pdf
16 The Presidency of Turks and Related Communities Abroad was established on 6 April 2010, and it is affiliated 
to the Office of the Prime Minister. It was established in order to coordinate Turkish citizens living abroad and 
to strengthen the ties with related communities. According to the first section of Law 5978 declaring the forma-
tion of the department, the main objective of the organization is to work with Turkish citizens living abroad and 
to help solve their problems. The second section of the law provides detailed information about the services and 
the activities of the department. The organization manages new social, cultural and economic activities with 
Turkish citizens and their descendents living abroad according to their needs and demands. It is mentioned that 
the activities of the organization are directed not only at Turkish citizens and their descendents abroad, but al-
so at migrant organizations, non-governmental organizations abroad and professional organizations. In additi-
on, it is worth mentioning that even though the main focus of activities is the Turkish diaspora, the department 
also concerns itself with foreign students coming to study in Turkey. It operates under three commissions: Con-
sultancy Committee of Citizens Abroad (Yurtdışı Vatandaşlar Danışma Kurulu), Evaluation of Foreign Stu-
dents Committee (Yabancı Öğrenci Değerlendirme Kurulu) and Cultural and Social Relations Coordination 
Committee (Kültürel ve Sosyal İlişkiler Eşgüdüm Değerlendirme Kurulu). For further details see http://www.
ytb.gov.tr, entry date 20 August 2011. 
17 For a detailed analysis of the Presidency of the Turks Abroad and Related Communities see Çetin (2011).
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“Soft power is also about arousing interest, capturing imagination and causing admiration. As the 
Arab media shows, Turkey does arouse interest in the Middle East. The Ankara Bureau of Al Jazeera 
is second only to Al Jazeera’s Washington Bureau among the news agency’s non-Arab offices in terms 
of the number of news stories filed. Evidently, viewers of Al Jazeera care about what is going on in Tur-
key. Arab television stations frequently broadcast derby football matches from Turkey. What is even 
more striking is the anecdotal evidence that popular Turkish TV shows such as Televole – a show de-
picting the lives of football players and fashion models – enjoy a substantial following in places like 
Egypt, Iran and Syria in spite of the obvious language barrier. This is significant because although they 
are considered tacky by the Turkish elites, such programs seem to capture the imagination of the ave-
rage Middle Eastern person in respect to the good life” (Altınay, 2008: 59).
Hence, it is not surprising to see that the image of Turkey has recently undergone radical 
change in the Middle East. A 2010 survey conducted by TESEV in the Arab world revealed that 
61 % of Arabs interviewed agreed that Turkey could be a model for the Arab World, 63 % 
agreed that Turkey sets a good example of the coexistence of democracy and Islam, and 64 % 
agreed that Turkey’s EU perspective makes Turkey an attractive partner for the Arab world 
(Akgün et al., 2010).
As we have previously established, modernity has been equated with Western cultures and 
perceived as a transformative process in line with Europeanization and Westernization. The Yu-
nus Emre Centres and other institutions such as the Presidency of Turks abroad and Related 
Communities contest the classical understanding of modernity and constitute a test for Euro-
American hegemony over modernization. In effect, the locations chosen and discourses ex-
pressed in the establishment of these centres focus on the revitalization of Turkey’s ties with east-
ern and regional countries. This introduces a new phenomenon in Turkish modernization where 
the Western model of modernization (also referred to as the classical model of modernity) is no 
longer the status quo. Furthermore, this phenomenon also raises questions about self-percep-
tions among ordinary Turks at home, and state perceptions of Turkish culture while it re-empha-
sizes itself in its role as modernizing agent.
In addition to Yunus Emre Centres in the Middle East and the Balkans, there are also cen-
tres in Europe, and it is noted that there are plans to open more there (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 
7, 2010: 10). These centres, which serve as contact points in various countries, also emphasize 
the importance of cultural interaction and cultural representation in foreign policy and bilateral 
relations. To that effect, Abdullah Gül, who performed the opening of the Yunus Emre Turkish 
Cultural Centre in London, stated that “great countries exist not only with their diplomats but 
also with their cultural assets” (Turkish Presidency, 09.11.2010). This statement is important in 
understanding the ways in which culture has become an important aspect of international rela-
tions. Furthermore, as Gül indicates, the discourses used in conjunction with the Yunus Emre In-
stitutes rely on the protection and dissemination of Turkish culture abroad. The use of “cultur-
al assets” is important because it is closely related to the use of certain selected cultural elements, 
particularly language and religion, or in other words assets, as a means of appealing to the de-
fined cultural heritages to be utilized in strengthening societal and political ties.
In terms of the centres located in European countries, currently in London and Brussels, 
one sees that there is an emphasis on how these centres will constitute a “home” for Turks liv-
ing in Europe. For instance, in his opening speech in London, Gül noted that: “This Centre will 
be a home for the four hundred thousand Turks in England. Our Embassy is surely their home 
but these Centres will be their ‘civil homes” (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 8, 2011: 5). As for the 
centre in Brussels, this city is home to a large migrant population, and the centre is expected to 
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contribute to the efficient introduction of Turkish culture and arts. Furthermore, the “cultural 
bridges” role of the centres in Europe will serve an important purpose in the promotion of Turk-
ish culture during the EU accession process (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 8, 2011:18). The Found-
ing Chairman of the Yunus Emre Board of Trustees, President Gül made a similar statement 
when he maintained that:
“These [Yunus Emre Centres] are Turkey’s invisible power. Keeping her cultural heritage alive is 
Turkey’s greatest strength. We should appreciate our past and our history. In today’s modern world, 
we should carry out our activities using modern methods and disseminate our solidarity and culture in 
the most favourable way” (Yunus Emre Bulletin, No: 7, 2010: 6).
In order to reveal the role of the Turkish foreign policy in the promotion of Turkish cul-
ture abroad, it is important to note that Turkey does not have an official foreign cultural poli-
cy.18 Cultural diplomacy is carried out within the scope of Turkish foreign policy under the ju-
risdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within the scope of cultural promotion efforts, the 
Ministry enters into bilateral and multilateral agreements based on various priorities and princi-
ples. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism is another important state institution taking part in 
the promotion of Turkish culture abroad. These promotion efforts are highly dependent on po-
litical relations and foreign policy priorities and they are important elements in the introduction 
of Turkish culture abroad. In that sense Turkish modernity is in part shaped by Turkish foreign 
policy vis-a-vis cultural policies and cultural diplomacy efforts.19
While there are embassies and in some cases cultural attachés in European countries, re-
cently the promotion of Turkish culture in the context of EU-Turkey relations has become an im-
portant aspect of the country’s approach to cultural promotion and cultural diplomacy. For in-
stance, Egemen Bağış, Minister of EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator, notes that the Institute is 
“the most important communications project” in Turkey’s EU accession process (Yunus Emre 
Bulletin, No: 9, 2011:11). An analysis of Turkey’s European Union Communication Strategy 
(SGEUA, 2010) reveals that it is important to establish a “Turkish brand” under which Turkish 
culture is presented. However, at the end of the day, we should not forget that the essential aim 
of the institutes is to provide support for the diaspora – meaning that the central aim is not ap-
pealing to non-Turkish nationals.20 As Abdullah Gül has highlighted several times, these centres 
aim to appeal to the Turkish diaspora and constitute a “home” where they can experience cul-
tural events as a collective community. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares that:
18 In saying “official foreign cultural policy”, we are referring to pre-determined course of action carried out by 
the state. 
19 For further information on Turkish cultural policy, see Ada (2011). 
20 Full text of the European Union Communication Strategy is available at: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/abis/?l=2, 
entry date 15 June 2011.
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“The basis of Turkey’s cooperation with the destination governments is the perception of integration 
constituted on, firstly, giving the immigrants a strong background of their native culture and, second-
ly, providing the mutual recognition by the immigrants and the local societies of each other’s culture, 
traditions and characteristics. Within the framework of this understanding, Turkey has been encoura-
ging expatriate Turks and the destination countries to establish new bonds with each other which will 
lead to the formation of prosperous societies enjoying cultural diversity” (Republic of Turkey Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs).21
In this framework, Yunus Emre Centres in Europe are instrumental in reaching out to the Turk-
ish Diaspora in European countries and acknowledging their vitality in representing Turkish cul-
ture.
Conclusion
It is very obvious to see that the Turkish electorate has become more attracted politically to AKP 
at a time when a culturalist and religious discourse has become globally very popular. The tim-
ing of Turkey’s European bid partly coincided with the aftermath of September 11, when Tur-
key, with its orientation to so-called moderate Islam, became instrumentalised by the USA and 
the EU as a role model for Muslim nations. Turkey was then pointed to as a bridge, not only be-
tween continents but also civilizations. A ‘moderate Islamic Turkey’ was praised by western 
countries in a way that also embraced the ruling party in Turkey. The instrumentalization of 
Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries was also welcomed by the Turkish political elite. 
PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and several other politicians as well as academics played along with 
this new role expecting that it would bring Turkey into a more favourable position in the Euro-
pean integration process. Turkey’s role as a mediator between Muslim and non-Muslim worlds 
was also credited by the United Nations when, together with the Spanish PM José Luis Rodrí-
guez Zapatero, Prime Minister Erdoğan was appointed by the UN to launch the Alliance of Civ-
ilizations initiative.
Against this background, the Turkish state’s promotional activities in European countries 
and in its own region were discussed in this paper, referring to the discourses of the ruling polit-
ical party elite and of members of various institutions, primarily the Yunus Emre Cultural Cen-
tres. It was revealed that the AKP government has recently generated a cultural/religious/civiliza-
tional discourse on a parallel with the rhetoric of Alliance of Civilizations to promote Turkey in 
the EU and other parts of the world, using a neo-Ottoman discourse. In promotion activities in 
EU countries, Turkey has been emphasizing its differences, while emphasizing its cultural and re-
ligious affinities with neighbours in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. In doing that, it seems that the ruling party is more concerned with revitalizing its he-
gemony in the region rather than advocating Turkey’s EU entry.
Turkey is willing to become a middle power, and recently has been trying to impose its he-
gemony in the region. However, it seems that there is a discrepancy between the ways in which 
the ruling political party (AKP) and the pro-European circles perceive the sources of Turkey’s be-
coming a soft power in the region. That is to say, AKP is likely to lean on the idea of Pax-Otto-
mana to become a hegemonic power, while pro-European circles are likely to believe that Tur-
key’s growing regional influence derives from its European perspective, which since 1999, has 
been perceived positively by neighbouring countries, in a way that has given Turkey a better ap-
21 Official Website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr , 
entry date 10 June 2011.
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pearance in terms of democracy, human rights, economy and universal values. It seems that this 
will be the dilemma of the next decade, and one which the Turkish political elite will have to re-
solve.
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